Cladwell demonstrates how differences in nations’ “attitudes towards birth control, broadly defined, are of central importance for the timing of fertility transition.” In other words, the ability of a nation to make the transition to a more controlled population growth policy depends as much on the socioeconomic desire of individuals as it does on the willingness of the existing government to successfully undertake transitional policies. Caldwell uses nations and regions across the globe in comparative arguments on why fertility control has been rather successful in industrial nations and certain Asian countries but not in sub-Saharan Africa.
One reason for the successful change in population policies in Asian and industrial nations is that the value of additional children has been reduced to the point where fewer children are economically and socially more desirable. Meanwhile, sub-Saharan African nations are very much caught in a pronatalist society where Africans, as demonstrated by Cochrane and Farid (1989), want more children than anywhere else in the world regardless of levels of income, education, health, urbanization. The pronatalist attitude of Africa, in other words, is not supported by their economical infrastructures, and hence the concern for population growth in this region. The importance of acknowledging the differences of fertility control policy and mortality control policies seem central to organizing successful population control policies, but the true difficulties are in achieving a societal attitude that wants population control borne out of natural developments rather than enforced political moves. Caldwell, in support of this argument, points out that Africa’s fertility rate is nearly double what Northwest Europe’s were when, during fertility transition, their infant mortality rates equaled Africa’s current fertility rates. So, despite appreciable drops in mortality rates thanks to the policies that have facilitated this change, fertility policies have not been as affective on the pronatalist societies’ fertility rates.
The success of fertility policies are attributed to the proper social atmospheres of nations that have or are undergoing fertility transition, independent of what demographic transition/ demographic-economic and threshold theories may predict or affirm. Perhaps better stated, “the decline of fertility began,” Caldwell argues, “when there was a reversal of the net flow of resources- toward children rather than parents- but that this economic change was a result of social changes that concentrated greater family concern on the children.” He notes that family labor for agricultural purposes is still of great value and thus maintains high rates of fertility. Hence, his theory of wealth flows describes the aforementioned desire for children to be hindering sub-Saharan’s decline in fertility by maintaining a flow of well from children to parents.
He also notes that the newness of the governments in African nations do not possess the respect of competent leadership necessary to carry out successful fertility policies as have been successful in historic governments such as China that retain “traditions of state or elite leadership.” As these African governments become antinatalist, their peoples are not changing with them, which is the problem as Caldwell sees it. Ultimately, some policy must pervade Africa’s pronatalist societies to encourage antinatalist attitudes to spur a reversal in wealth flows that will begin a decline in fertility.