Recently, an increasing number of population policies have explicitly targeted the status of women in order to decrease rapid fertility growth rates. Women who live in the First World, where fertility rates are the lowest, tend to have a higher status than women in the Third World, where fertility rates are the highest. This trend raises two questions, is the status of women the key determinant in fertility rates or is women's independence and a low fertility rate the concurrent results of some other determinant? Although the status of women may be a major factor in determining fertility rates, it is not the single cause of low fertility rates. The debate is to what degree does the status of women play a part in fertility.
Women’s autonomy can be a useful proxy for determining the status of women, but in certain cultures a higher social status is accompanied by a lesser amount of autonomy. Autonomy can be defined as “condition or quality of self-governing…self-determination, independence.”( Abadian 1795) Autonomy is illustrated through access, control, and independence in decision-making. However, independence in this case does not preclude the support of women’s groups and networks that build solidarity. Instead, “independence” in this case most aptly refers to independence from men.(Abadian 1796)
In the first study, conducted by Sousan Abadian, women’s autonomy is determined according to three factors: the age of women at the time of marriage, the age difference between the spouses, and the percentage of female enrollment in secondary education. The age of women at marriage is a component of autonomy because girls that are married off very early may lack the opportunity to gain self-reliance and become dependent on their husband for survival.
A large age gap between the spouses can also prevent women from gaining independence for two reasons. First of all, in societies where the ability to make decisions and control of resources lies with the most senior individual, “…the more the wife will be subject to age bias and not just gender bias in the curtailment of her autonomy by her husband and family.”(Abadian 1797) Secondly, in most patriarchal societies there is a high premium placed on having sons because only men have access to resources. If there is a large age disparity between the spouses, the wife will most likely become a widow, thus, she will have more sons to decrease the risks of being a widow.
The final factor, female enrollment in secondary school, can be an indicator of women’s autonomy for two reasons. Firstly, women who receive at least a secondary education may have more career opportunities, and therefore delay both marriage and/or motherhood, lowering fertility rates. Secondly, women who have at least a secondary education may have a greater openness to new ideas, particularly those that pertain to the role of women in society. Thus, the level of women receiving education is not only representative of the women’s autonomy in that society, but is also an instrument for increasing women’s autonomy in society. Female education can be a mechanism for cultural change because education
fosters an identity for women not restricted to wife and mother (with the attending attitudes about the appropriateness of an increased role in the decision making and control over earnings); may encourage aspirations for a high standard and enhanced quality of living; may promote increased investment in children and a smaller desired family size; may expose individuals to contraception and its use…; and may enhance husband and wife communication. (Abadian 1798)
For all these reasons, female education can be the means to lowering fertility rates.
According to the results of Abadian’s study of the correlation between female autonomy and fertility rates in the Third World, fertility rates are most strongly related to the following factors in descending order: infant mortality rates, female secondary school education, female age at marriage, and spousal age difference. Infant mortality rates are also highly correlated with total fertility and, female education, income, and female age at marriage because mothers with higher education, income, and experience from age are more likely to be able to prevent the death of a child during infancy. Other factors that had a significant impact on fertility include urbanization, access to family planning, and high levels of income. The study found that although women’s autonomy is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for fertility decline in the short-run, women’s autonomy does indeed have a significant impact on decreasing fertility rates, particularly education levels and age at marriage because “greater female autonomy may be thought to provide the conditions under which the other variables can more powerfully affect fertility.” (Abadian 1795)
In a second study by A. Dharmalingham and S. Phillip Morgan, two South Indian villages are compared in terms of female autonomy, female education, and fertility rates because the two villages are in neighboring districts, are very similar in caste composition, religious mix, ecology, and historical backgrounds (Dharmalingam 190) In Village I, eighty percent of women are employed in rolling beedis (similar to cigarettes), but have low levels of education. Rolling beedis has inadvertently provided the women with a significant amount of autonomy, in terms of mobility within the village, freedom to associate with other women, and a source of income independent from their husbands. In Village II, on the other hand, women have high levels of education but rarely work. Surprisingly, the fertility rates in the two villages do not very greatly. In Village II, education has not increased women’s autonomy, but has increased the cost of having children since every child typically receives an education. Because the cost of having children has increased, fertility rates in Village II are as low as in Village I.
In this study, “autonomy” is calculated in terms of perceived economic independence, freedom to move within and between villages, and spousal interaction concerning finances and family size. In Village I, ninety-three percent of married women work for wages, where as in the second village, less than one third receive wages. In addition, women in Village I were 2.7 times more likely to keep their own earnings compared to the women in Village II, and were seven times more likely to have a say in how those earnings are spent. In Village II the women’s perceived economic independence is best exemplified by the fact that the women in Village II are 8.6 times more likely to believe that she could support herself without a husband.
Women in Village I have greater freedom of movement necessary for producing and delivering the beedis they have created. Although women from both villages could travel to local markets unaccompanied, women in Village II were 7.3 times more likely to travel to the next village unaccompanied. Overall, women in Village I are over 11 times more likely to enjoy greater freedom of movement than women in Village II. The researchers also note that very few women in Village II were willing to talk to outsiders, especially women from wealthier families, while women from every social class in Village I were willing to talk to outsiders.
Finally, in terms of interaction between spouses, women in Village I are more than twice as likely to discuss family finances with their spouse and more than 2.5 times as likely to discuss the number of children they plan to have. According to the study’s results, women in Village I have substantially greater influence over family decisions than Village II.
Despite the large disparity in autonomy, the study finds that the likelihood of using birth control in Village I compared to Village II is statistically insignificant. In this case, education has not been a mechanism for cultural change, but has increased the costs of children therefore decreasing the fertility rate. Although autonomy may reduce fertility in some cases, this study illustrates that autonomy is neither necessary nor sufficient to lowering fertility, as exemplified by the situation in Village II. Instead, high levels of education, even when they have not impact of women’s autonomy, but are related to the cost of living, can drive down fertility rates.
Although the women of Village II have low levels of autonomy and have still achieved low fertility rates, most policies still advocate increasing the status of women as key to reducing fertility. Some might argue that women’s rights activists and lobbyists are using population policies to push their own agendas, even though policies that focus on increasing women’s autonomy may not have a direct affect on fertility rates. (Basu 5) Although women’s autonomy is neither necessary nor sufficient to reducing fertility rates in the short-run, there is no indication that greater autonomy for women would increase fertility rates. Thus, there can only be positive consequences to pursuing fertility policies that target women’s issues. Any population policy cannot be expected to be applicable across cultures, and thus, specific cultural characteristics must be taken into account when determining population policies. Despite cultural differences, there remains an evident relationship between a higher level of autonomy for women and lower fertility rates in the lesser developed countries, but whether or not the status of women has a direct or indirect effect on fertility is yet to be determined.
Sousan Abadian, "Women's Autonomy and Its Impact on Fertility", in World Development, Vol.24, No. 12, December 1996.
A. Dharmalingam and S. Philip Morgan, "Women's Work, Autonomy and Birth Control: Evidence From Two South Indian Villages", in Population Studies, Vol. 50, No. 2, July 1996.
Alaka Malwade Basu, "The 'Politicization' of Fertility to Achieve Non-Demographic Objectives, in Population Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, March 1997.