Gary Becker, a member of the Chicago School of economics, is one of the leading theorists behind the idea that the increases in marriage instability and nonmarriage in America since the 1960s are primarily caused by women’s rising economic independence in the post-war era. He argues that marriage is based upon the division of labor between husband and wife–the husband specializes in market work and the wife specializes in domestic work. [1] According to Becker, when the wife enters the labor force and becomes less specialized in domestic work and more economically independent, her need or desire to marry or stay married falls. Becker believes that this decline in the desirability of marriage is precipitated by the growing prevalence of welfare benefits and divorce settlements that favor women and un-wed mothers. Two social economists, Valerie Kincade Oppenheimer and Elaine McCrate argue that Becker over-exaggerates the impact of women’s rising economic independence on the fate of the American family. They both assert that factors other than the rise in female income–changes in attitudes towards the institution of marriage, increased cohabitation instead of marriage, a drop in men’s earnings, or a rise in the difficulty of men’s career development–may be more significant in terms of the growing instability of the American family. Additionally, Oppenheimer and McCrate suggest that welfare and divorce settlements favorable to women and un-wed mothers may actually do more than simply precipitate marriage instability. According to Oppenheimer and McCrate, these benefits may be more important causes of marriage instability than women’s increased economic independence.
Oppenheimer directly attacks Becker’s argument by discrediting both its theoretical and empirical support. In terms of theory, Oppenheimer claims that Becker inappropriately uses the baby boom era as the benchmark against which more recent changes in marriage and divorce should be compared. According to Oppenheimer, the 1950s and 60s were an anomaly in terms of “homogeneity in the timing of marriage” and marriage stability.[2] In the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, just as now, the age at which people married was highly variable–couples before the baby boom era and after the baby boom era were similarly inclined to delay marriage. Additionally, Oppenheimer comments that marriages contracted during the baby boom era were more stable than marriages contracted before and after the baby boom era. Thus, it is likely that the baby boom era, rather than the modern era, was the atypical era in terms of marriage and divorce.
Oppenheimer further criticizes Becker’s argument by claiming that Becker overlooks the crucial distinction between delayed marriage and nonmarriage. In Becker's argument, every woman who is of age to be married and is not married is thought to be opposed to the institution of marriage. He fails to recognize that some unmarried women are simply between marriages or delaying marriage until later in life. Oppenheimer claims that because post-boom cohorts have not yet reached the age at which marriage or remarriage is no longer possible (typically a very old age), "it is not possible to provide a definitive answer to whether recent trends mainly signify rising rates of nonmarriage or of delayed marriage." [3] Thus, according to Oppenheimer, the current situation in America is still only a situation of delayed marriage and Becker is wrong to assume that marriage has already been significantly rejected by women.
Finally, Oppenheimer points out that there is little empirical support for Becker's claim that women's economic independence is the most significant factor in the decline of the American family. Oppenheimer writes,
In fact, the evidence indicates that a better labor market position either has no effect or else has a positive one on women's marriage behavior.[4]
Oppenheimer uses educational attainment as a measure of women's labor market position and finds that, after controlling for factors which inherently delay marriage such as school enrollment and career development, women with more education are no less inclined to marry than women with less education.[5] She suggests that the positive effects of women's favorable labor market position are offsetting the negative effects and reducing the significance of this factor in the recent trend towards fewer marriages and/or delayed marriage. Some positive effects of women's economic independence include women's ability to "afford" to marry men who may not be great providers, their ability to fund the creation of an attractive image, and their ability to meet men with similar interests and goals in the workplace. In some situations the positive effects of women's economic independence out-weigh the negative effects. For example, Oppenheimer finds that educated black women are much more likely to marry that uneducated black women. She also finds that employment in upper-level white collar jobs exhibits no negative effect on marriage while working in an unskilled job sometimes "depresses" marriage.[6]
In an effort to downplay Becker and other economists' emphasis on the role of women's economic independence in the recent decline and delay of marriage, Oppenheimer offers numerous alternative explanations for this trend. One alternative explanation is the rise in couples who cohabitate. Oppenheimer credits this recent rise in cohabitation to the advances in contraception, “substantial changes in premarital sexual behavior,” and “growing liberalization of attitudes regarding sex” that have occurred in the past 25 years.[7] Because cohabitation is such a new phenomenon, it can not yet be determined whether its rise signifies a rejection of marriage or merely an increase in the desire to delay marriage. Oppenheimer seems to suggest, however, that cohabitation is more likely a means of delaying marriage. She notes that the proportion of first marriages in which the couple cohabitated beforehand rose from 9 percent for the marriage cohorts of 1965-74 to 39 percent for the 1980-84 cohorts. For people entering their second marriage, the rise in the proportion of couples who cohabitated was from 29 percent for 1965-74 marriage cohorts to 54 percent for 1980-84 marriage cohorts.[8] The importance of these findings is that cohabitation increased for couples who did eventually marry. Oppenheimer suggests that cohabitation, for these couples, was merely a means of feeling married, but not actually being married until one or both partners was economically stable and settled in their career.
Elaine McCrate adds to Oppenheimer’s list of alternative explanations for the recent decline and delay of marriages by suggesting that only marriages of a particular kind have been rejected­–unhealthy and unhappy marriages. McCrate looks at why divorce rates in America fell dramatically in the 1980s from their all-time highs during the 1960s and 70s. She finds that women’s economic independence was steadily growing throughout this entire time period (the 1960s through the 1980s); therefore, this factor, alone, could not have been reason for the rise and fall in divorce rates. Alternately, McCrate suggests that women’s economic independence finally gained women a “voice” in marriage by the 1980s rather than simply the option to “exit;” therefore, women typically refused their marriages in the 1980s only if the marriage was unhealthy and “unopen” to negotiation.[9] McCrate looks at marriage as a bargaining situation in which husbands and wives each bring their own service, market or domestic, to the table. She believes that wives who suddenly assume a “voice” and a place in the market can successfully renegotiate the terms of their marriage–if the marriage is happy and healthy–by putting some of the burden of domestic service upon their husbands. This sort of renegotiation is what began to occur in 1980s that caused divorce rates to fall. McCrate points out, however, that although divorce rates in the 1980s were less than divorce rates during the 1960s and 70s, a decline and/or delay in marriage still occurred over this entire period because women with “voice” refused the unhappy and unhealthy marriages that women of previous decades endured.
On par with McCrate’s argument, Oppenheimer suggests that women’s rising economic independence encourages more healthy and adaptive family strategies and eliminates those family strategies that are unhealthy and corrupt. She views married women’s employment as a “functional substitute for the work of children.”[10] When married women enter the labor force they earn income that may, otherwise, need to be earned by the family’s sons or daughters. Thus, these women sacrifice their time and domesticity so that their children may attend school, study, and become higher wage earners in the future. Additionally, Oppenheimer argues that married women, being adults, typically have educational attainments roughly equivalent to their husbands’; therefore, these women can earn a much higher wage than their unskilled children. Thus, it is more efficient for families to rely on the mother’s income rather than the child’s income. In sum, Oppenheimer, like McCrate, argues that women’s economic independence and entrance into the labor force is an advantage rather than a threat to the American family.
McCrate and Oppenheimer agree on another alternative explanation for the recent decline and delay of marriages. This explanation is that the rise in welfare benefits to un-wed mothers and the rise in divorce settlements favorable to women that occurred in the post-war era stimulated divorce and fewer marriages. McCrate argues that public assistance for poor unmarried mothers was greater in the 1960s and 70s that it was in the 1980s–women could receive AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) payments as high as $180 dollars in 1977 and payments of only $148 in 1987.[11] For this reason, divorce and nonmarriage were more appealing during the 1960s and 70s. McCrate also points out that divorce settlements in the 1960s and 70s were more enticing and favorable to women than they were in the 1980s. For example, in 1979, 46.7 percent of white and 27.2 percent of black “ever-divorced” women had received a settlement; by 1987, those numbers had fallen to 34.2 percent and 13.7 percent.[12] In conclusion, McCrate argues that a rise in public assistance and divorce settlements favorable to un-wed mothers and women–not necessarily a rise in women’s economic independence–played a large role in the decline of marriage in the post-war era. The simultaneous rise and fall of public assistance/divorce settlement payments and divorce rates in the United States throughout the1960s, 70s, and 80s support McCrate’s argument.
Finally, Oppenheimer, in particular, is troubled by Becker and other’s focus on women’s employment and earnings in the debate over America’s recent marriage decline because she views men’s employment and earnings as having a greater impact. As previously stated and explained, Oppenheimer’s empirical studies show no significant negative relationship between women’s labor market position and their desire or ability to marry. With men, however, this relationship is different. Oppenheimer finds that men with more difficult career-entry transitions and lower labor market positions during their early work careers are less likely to marry or marry early in life. She determines the ease and/or difficulty of men’s career development by looking at the level of income and full or part-time work men of different races and educational backgrounds received upon entry into the labor market. Her finding report that white men with more difficult career-entry transitions were 10-20 percent less likely to marry 11 years out of school than white men with easy career-entry transitions.[13] For black men, the difference in marriage rates between those with difficult career-entry transitions and those with easy career-entry transitions was between 20 and 30 percent.[14] Thus, men of both races, were similarly less inclined to marry if their earnings and employment stability were poor upon entry in to the labor market. This finding explains the recent decline and delay in marriages in the United States because, as Oppenheimer points out, the career-entry process for young men has been difficult in the past 25 years due to a rise in economic equality and labor market competition during this time.[15]
Oppenheimer suggests that men’s labor position has a greater impact upon marriage rates in the United States than women’s labor market position because, traditionally, men have been relied upon to provide an income from the marketplace for their families.[16] A family’s dependence upon the husband’s income is especially high when the wife is either pregnant or staying home to care for the children. Even today, in this modern world, it is uncommon for husbands to stay at home and do the child-rearing while the wife works to bring home the family’s income–the wife’s income is often only secondary to the husband’s income. Thus, many times, both men and women wish to delay marriage if the man’s career is unsteady and undeveloped, but typically only women who wish to delay marriage if the woman’s career is unsteady and undeveloped. As a result, the impact of the man’s labor market position upon marriage decisions and timing is greater than the woman’s.
Oppenheimer and McCrate take a similar stance against Becker’s theory of the importance of women’s economic independence on marriage and divorce trends in the United States. Neither economist claims that women’s economic independence has no role in the recent decline and delay of marriages, but both Oppenheimer and McCrate assert that other factors have an equal, if not more important, role. Some of the additional factors that Oppenheimer and McCrate consider are increased cohabitation before marriage, less tolerance for unhappy and unhealthy marriages, better welfare and divorce settlements for women and un-wed mothers, and the recent difficulty of men’s career-entry transition.
Sources:
McCrate, Elaine. “Accounting for the Slowdown in the Divorce Rate in the 1980s: A Bargaining Perspective.” Review of Social Economy. Winter 1992, vol. 50. 404-419.
Oppenheimer, Valerie Kincade, Matthijs Kalmijn, and Nelson Lim. “Men’s Career Development and Marriage Timing During A Period of Rising Inequality.” Demography. August 1997, vol.34, issue 3. 311-330.
Oppenheimer, Valerie Kincade. “Women’s Rising Employment and the Future of the Family in Industrial Societies.” Population and Development Review. June 1994, No. 2. 293-342.
[2] Ibid., 299 & 301.
[3] Ibid., 304.
[4] Ibid., 312.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 314.
[7] Ibid., 307.
[8] Ibid.
[9] McCrate, Elaine. “Accounting for the Slowdown in the Divorce Rate in the 1980s: A Bargaining Perspective.” Review of Social Economy. Winter 1992, vol. 50. 405.
[10] Oppenheimer, Valerie Kincade. “Women’s Rising Employment and the Future of the Family in Industrial Societies.” 321.
[11] McCrate, Elaine. “Accounting for the Slowdown in the Divorce Rate in the 1980s: A Bargaining Perspective.” 414.
[12] Ibid., 415.
[13] Oppenheimer, Valerie Kincade, Matthijs Kalmijn, and Nelson Lim. “Men’s Career Development and Marriage Timing During A Period of Rising Inequality.” Demography. August 1997, vol.34, issue 3. 326.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., 313.
[16] Ibid.